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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

HEBER CREEPER, INC.,

:
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

Respondent and
Cross-Appellant,

:

-vGORDON MENDENHALL and
LEON RITCHIE,
Appellants and
Cross-Respondents.

:
: No.
00O00

20952
c

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The ultimate issues in this appeal are, rather than the
three numbered in Appellants1 brief at i[ts page 2:
1.

whether the trial court correctly determined that

Heber Creeper, Inc. was entitled, by a ifair preponderance of the
evidence, to be awarded Judgment against Gordon Mendenhall and
Leon Ritchie in the orincipal amount of at least $17,385.00; and
2.

whether the trial court er^ed in failing to deter-

mine that Heber Creeper, Inc. had provecji, by a fair preponderance
of the evidence, that Heber Creeper, Incf. was entitled to be
awarded judgment against both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie
in substantially larger sums.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSft-APPEAL
Heber Creeper, Inc.'s position is that, at a minimum,
the trial court's judgment against both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr.
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Ritchie should be affirmed.

Heber Creeper, Inc. seeks herein

also to have the trial courtfs Judgment modified to award damages
against Gordon Mendenhall in the total principal amount of
$299,194.00 and to award damages against Leon Ritchie in the
total principal amount of $52,475.00.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was filed by Heber Creeper, Inc., a Utah
for-profit corporation, against Gordon Mendenhall and Leon
Ritchie in the Fourth District Court of Wasatch County, on
December 30, 1982.

It was tried to the bench (Hon. Cullen Y.

Christensen) on March 11, 12, 13, and 19, 1985.
The dispute concerns itself, generally, with the
question of the duty of care and loyalty of directors of a forprofit corporation to the corporation, and, more specifically,
with questions including the temporal duration of that duty and
the answerability in damages to the corporation in the event that
the duty is breached.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Heber Creeper, Inc. respectfully submits that the
"Statement of Facts" appearing at pages 2 through 4 of
Appellants1 Brief is both incomplete and, in many respects, inaccurate, and submits for the Court's consideration, in lieu
thereof, the following relevant and indisputable facts patterned
larqely after the trial court's Findings appearing at cages
numbered 32 through 42 of Appellants' Brief):
1.

Heber Creeper, Inc. is a Utah business corporation

which was incorporated on or about January 7, 1971 as Wasatch
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Railway and Development Co. and whose nafae was duly changed, on
or about June 28, 1972, to its present nftme. Exs. 10, 1; tr. at
50, 56.
2.

Gordon Mendenhall was an incorporator of Heber

Creeper, Inc. and was a director of the (corporation uninterruptedly from the time of incorporation unt|il December 1981. Ex.
10; tr. at 50, 55, 57-58, 217, 392-93.
3.

Mr. Mendenhall was also a djirector of Heber Creeoer,

Inc. from May 14, 1982 until at least Ju|ne 22, 1982.

Ex. 10; Ex.

14; tr. at 169, 217-18, 392-93.
4.

Mr. Mendenhall was an off icier (vice-oresident) of

Heber Creeper, Inc. from 1975 through 1979 and was again an
officer (secretary-treasurer) of the corporation from May 14,
1982 until at least June 22, 1982.

Ex. 10; Ex. 14; tr. at

217-18, 392-93.
5.

Leon Ritchie was an incorporator of Heber Creeper,

Inc. and was an original director of thq corooration and a director during the years 1971, 1972, 1979, c*nd 1980, as well.

Ex.

10; tr. at 50, 55-56, 59.
6.

Mr. Ritchie was again a dirfector of Heber Creeper,

Inc. from May 14, 1982 until February 1083.

Ex. 8; Ex. 9; Ex.

10; Complaint, f 5, record at 1; Answer^ record at 9.
7.

Mr. Ritchie was an officer (vice-president) of Heber

Creeper, Inc. from May 14, 1982 until September 17, 1982.

Ex. 8;

Ex. 9; Ex. 26.
8.

Timoanogos Preservation Society (hereinafter,

"TPS"), a Utah not-for-orofit corporation, was incorporated on or
about August 29, 1978. Ex. 10, tr. at 6^, 632.
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9.

Mr. Mendenhall was an incorporator of TPS, was

approved by Heber Creeoer, Inc.'s president to be a member of the
Board of Trustees of TPS for the purpose of protecting Heber
Creeper, Inc.'s interests, and was a member of the TPS Board
uninterruptedly from the time of the incorporation of TPS
until at least November 30, 1982.

Ex. 56; Tr. at 68-69; 131-32;

397.
10.

Mr. Mendenhall was an officer of TPS uninterrup-

tedly from the time of the incorporation of TPS until at least
November 30, 1982, and he held the positions, at various times
during that period, of treasurer, secretary, and secretarytreasurer.

E.g., exs. 5, 11, 38, 39, 40, 46, 47, and 56.

11.

Mr. Ritchie was a member of the TPS Board of

Trustees uninterruptedly from at least July 10, 1981 until at
least November 30, 1982.

E.g., exs. 51, 55, 56; tr. at 695,

707-09.
12.

Mr. Ritchie was an officer (treasurer) of TPS at

least during a part of 1982 and was released from that position
on July 13, 1982. Ex. 40.
13.

Heber Creeper, Inc. operated the train commonly

known as the "Heber Creeper" (hereinafter "the train") from the
1971 through 1980 operating seasons.
14.

TPS operated the train during the 1981 and 1982

operating seasons.
15.

Tr. at 572.

The "Heber Creeper" line ran, at all times material

hereto, from terminal grounds located in Feber City, Wasatch
County, Utah to the Bridal Veil Falls terminal, located in Provo
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Canvonf in Utah County, Utah.
16.

Heber Creeper, Inc. 's operation of the train showed

a small annual average cash loss ($1,085.00) for operatinq
seasons 1971 through 1980.
17.

Ex. 34; tr. at 367-71.

Excluding operating years 1975 and 1976, during

which years Heber Creeper, Inc. suffere4 cash losses in connection with certain non-train-operation business interprises, Heber
Creeper, Inc. showed an annual cash profiit of $2,881.00 for the
years during which Heber Creeper, Inc. operated the train.

Ex.

34; Tr. at 367-71.
18.

In early 1981, Heber Creeper, Inc. and TPS

discussed, in a series of joint and separate Board meetings, an
arrangement according to which
(a)

TPS would lease from Hebe it1 Creeper, Inc. the
right to operate the traih and,

(b)

in connection with that proposed lease arrangement,
TPS would, among other things, (i) satisfy certain
debts owed by plaintiff ii)i the amount of at least
$130,000.00; and (ii) acquire, by paying one dollar
per share, the then-outst&nding 116,719 shares of
Heber Creeper, Inc. stockf

Ex. 3; Tr. at

95-100, 536-37, 683.
19.

The arranged-for lease wa$ in fact executed by and

between Heber Creeper, Inc. and TPS (Ex> 3, tr. at 100) but the
debt retirement and stock purchase arrangement was never consummated.

Tr. at 108.
20.

On July 10, 1981, the president of Heber Creeper,
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Inc. appeared at a TPS Board Meeting and demanded that the TPS
Board members honor the early 1981 debt-retirement and purchase
arrangement.
21.

Ex. 5; tr. at 104-07.
On August 18, 1981, the TPS Board of Trustees

approved a proposal that would have, if consummated, caused TPS
to strike a business agreement with Heber Creeper, Inc. on terms
at least as favorable to Heber Creeper, Inc. as those contemplated in early 1981; and Mr. Mendenhall and one Richard Buys,
fellow TPS Board Member and then-president of TPS, were directed
to present to Heber Creeper, Inc. the formal proposed so adopted
by TPS.

Ex. 48.
22.

The next day, August 19, 1981, Mr. Mendenhall and

the said Mr. Buys submitted to Heber Creeper, Inc. a formal proposal which was substantially less favorable to Heber Creeper,
Inc., than the one so approved by the TPS Board; the one formally
adopted by the TPS Board the day earlier was deemed by Mr.
Mendenhall to be not financially feasible from the TPS perspective.

The deal, which wold have been a good deal for Heber

Creeper, Inc. shareholders, was never consummated.

Ex. 6; e.g.,

Ex. 48; tr. at 108-12, 207-08. 219-20, 455, 738.
23.

On May 12, 1982, a Settlement Agreement (Ex. 2) was

executed, of which both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie were
aware, (a) which resolved certain litigation then pending, to
which Heber Creeper, Inc. and TPS and others were signatories;
(b) which expressly (except for claims asserted in Wasatch County
Civil Nos. 5720 and 5722, none of which is pertinent hereto) did
away with and laid to rest any and all past claims and disputes
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between and among its signatories; and (\c) which, among other
things: (i) required Heber Creeper, Inc. to allow TPS to operate
the train in operating seasons beginning in 1982; (ii) required
TPS to oay to Heber Creeper, Inc. 10% ofl the gross income from
the sale of certain food and non-alcohol[ic beverage sales made in
connection with the operation of the Heber Creeper train in
ooerating seasons beginning in 1982, or $10,000.00 per operating
season, whichever figure was greater; (|ii) required TPS to
establish, in connection with the operation of the Heber Creeper
train, accounting procedures in conformity with generally
accepted principles of accounting so th^t audits and financial
statements could be adequately prepared^ and (iv) required TPS to
employ internal and external accounting controls for the purpose
of assuring an accurate reflection of c^sh intake and expenditures relative to the operation of th$ Heber Creeper train.
24.

Both Mr. Mendenhall and M£. Ritchie were present at

the May 14, 1982 conclusion of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s 1982 annual
shareholders meeting, during which those who were present and who
were about to be named directors, including both Mr. Mendenhall
and Mr. Ritchie, were informed that if ^hey should accept their
positions of directors, they would assume fiduciary obligations
and would breach their fiduciary obligations if they should do
anything that would undermine the Settlement Agreement referenced
in the foregoing paragraph 23 hereof.

Exs. 8, 9; tr. at 121-22,

162, 165.
25.

On June 12, 1982, Heber Creeper, Inc.'s Board of

Directors met, with Mr. Mendenhall present as director and secre-
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tary and at that meeting there was discussed, among other things,
the concern of one or more directors with respect to the competence and honesty, or lack thereof, of one Mr. Monte Bona, the
then-manager of TPS, and at that meeting those oresent (all the
directors of Heber Creeper, Inc. other than Mr. Ritchie) unanimously approved a policy of confidentiality with respect to the
discussion of the corporation's affairs with other parties.

Ex.

27; tr. at 195-200.
26.

On June 14, 1982, Mr. Mendenhall related to the TPS

Board some of the items that were discussed in the said Heber
Creeper, Inc. meeting of two days earlier and made the motion
that the said Mr.

Monte Bona be appointed to the Board 06 TPS,

which motion was seconded and approved. Ex. 38; tr. at 428-29.
27.

From at least as early as July 1982 until at least

September 1982 Mr. Mendenhall was paid $400.00 oer month by TPS
for the rendering of accounting and related services to TPS.

Ex.

40; tr. at 589.
28.

At some time prior to June 22, 1982, Mr.

Mendenhall became av/are of the fact that TPS planned to assert a
substantial claim against Heber Creeper, Inc. based on matters
arising prior to the execution of the said Settlement Agreement
referenced in paragraph 23 hereof;

Mr. Mendenhall did not

apprise HeDer Creeper, Inc. of his said awareness or of the fact
of such claim prior to June 22, 1982, and no TPS meeting occurred
between June 22, 1982 and July 1, 1982.
29.

Tr. at 180, 487.

On or about June 22, 1982, Mr. Mendenhall submitted

to Mr. Gene Moore, then-president of Heber Creeper, Inc. a letter
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of resignation from Mr. Mendenhallfs positions as director and
secretary-treasurer of Heber Creeper, Ipc.
30.

Ex. 14; tr. at 169.

On or about July 1, 1982, Mr. Mendenhall wrote Mr.

Gene Moore a letter asserting a claim ii(i favor of TPS and against
Heber Creeper, Inc. in the amount of $3t/737.35, for alleged
claims that arose, if at all, prior to the execution of the
aforesaid Settlement Agreement which, or^ its face, extinguished
all such prior claims.
31.

Ex. 2, pp. 11-12; Ex. 7; tr. at 169-70.

Mr. Mendenhall, who was p4id by TPS to do the TPS

accounting work, failed, both prior to ^nd subsequent to June
22, 1982, to cause TPS to establish reasonably acceptable
accounting procedures, and to cause TPS to employ the internal
and external cash controls required by t|he said Settlement
Agreement. Tr. at 358-61, 379, 382, 497.
32.

In August 1982, Mr. Ritchip and Mr. Mendenhall took

the position that the TPS claim against Beber Creeper, Inc. was a
valid claim.
33.

E^g., exs. 41, 42; tr. atft.71-74,221-22, 235.
On September 17, 1982, at £ meeting of Heber

Creeper, Inc.'s Board of Directors, Mr. Ritchie was removed as
Heber Creeper, Inc.'s vice president.
34.

E£. 26; tr. at 194, 235.

Subsequent to May 14, 1982^ and both prior to and

subsequent to July 1, 1982, until at lea^t November 30, 1982,
neither neither Mr. Mendenhall nor Mr. Ritchie took action to
assure that payments under the said Settlement Agreement would be
made to Heber Creeper, Inc.

Tr. at 220; See, e.g, Exs. 39, 40, 41,

42, 43, 45, 46.
35.

The regular 1982 train operating season ended on or
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about Labor Day of that year, the first Monday in September,
1982, and TPS operated the train throughout the 1982 season.
36.

At all times subsequent to May 14, 1982 until at

least November 30, 1982, TPS had the ability to pay to Heber
Creeper, Inc. all sums due under the terms of the said Settlement
Agreement; TPS, with the concurrence of both Mr. Mendenhall and
Mr. Ritchie, in effect treated any such sums as an offset against
the aforesaid pre-Settlement Agreement claims of TPS.

E.g.,

Exs. 17, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 46; tr. at 171-74, 456, 486.
37.

No payment whatsoever has been made to Heber

Creeper, Inc. by TPS since the time the said Settlement Agreement
was executed.
38.

Tr. at 200.
Based on the reported 1982 total gross income from

the operation of the Heber Creeper train and on the historic
percentage relationship between total gross income and food and
non-alcoholic beverage gross income experienced in the operation
of the trainr the food and non-alcoholic beverage gross income of
TPS for 1982 was projected by Heber Creeper, Inc. 's expert to be
$173,850.00, that figure was not controverted by other evidence,
and Heber Creeper, Inc.'s entitlement thereto, oursuant to the
terms of the said Settlement Agreement, was thus fixed by the
trial court to be $17,385.00.

Ex. 34; tr. at 360-66; Finding of

Fact No. 49.
39.

Sometime prior to June 22, 1982, a Harriman

railroad coach belonging to Heber Creeper, Inc. and located on
the Heber City terminal grounds was gutted by TPS workmen and refitted as a dining car; the seats have been removed from the
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Heber City terminal grounds and have n^ver been replaced.

Tr. at

265-77, 297-307, 318-31.
40.

During the 1982 train operating season, metal scrap

belonging to plaintiff was taken from t|he Heber City terminal
grounds as part of and pursuant to TPS [policies and practices.
E.g., tr. at 297-304.
41.

Both Mr. Mendenhall and M^r. Ritchie were on and

about the terminal grounds on at leat several occasions during
the time periods that the Harriman coach seats were being removed
and during the period that the metal sc^rap was being removed, and
neither reported to the Heber Creeper, Jnc. Board that such conduct was taking pice.

Tr. at 201; 247; 301-07; 499-50; 691-92;

739-40.
42.

The trial court found, witih respect to the failed

purchase and debt-retirement arrangement} (referenced in the
foregoing facts numbered 18 through 22) ,| that the evidence did
not preponderate in favor of Heber Creeper Inc. on its claim that
Mr. Mendenhall should be held liable to Heber Creeper, Inc. in
the amount of $246,900.00, or in any amolunt, by reason of his
acts or omissions in connection with tha|t matter.
Fact No.

Finding of

33.
43.

The trial court found, with respect to the non-

payment to Heber Creeoer, Inc. of the mopies it was entitled to
receive under the 1982 Settlement Agreement (referenced in the
foregoing facts numbered 23 through 38), by a fair preponderance
of the evidence, that both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie had
breached thier duty of care and loyalty io Heber Creeper, Inc.,
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and that Heber Creeper, Inc. had been damaged, as a direct and
proximate result thereof, in the princioal amount of $17,385.00.
Findings of Fact Nos. 49 through 52.
44.

The trial court found, with respect to the

alienation and dissipation of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s assets during
the 1982 train operating season ( referenced in the foregoing
facts numbered 39 through 40), that the evidence did not oreponderate in favor of Heber Creeper, Inc. on its claims that Mr.
Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie, or either of them, should be held
liable to Heber Creeper, Inc. in the amount of $35,090.00, or
in any amount, by reason of their omission in connection with
that matter.

Finding of Fact No. 54.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Heber Creeper, Inc.'s position herein, based on the
foregoing statement of indisputable facts and based on other
facts discussed hereinbelow, in light of the case law of this
Court and in light of other respected authorities, can be rather
easily stated.

It is (1) that the evidence adduced at trial

clearly preponderated in its favor with respect to the trial
court's determination that it was entitled to recover, from Mr.
Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie, the principal amount of $17,385.00
under the 1982 Settlement Agreement; (2) that the trial court's
application of relevant law to the evidence adduced in connection
therewith was clearly correct; (3) that Appellants have advanced
no cognizable grounds for reversal of the Judgment; (4) that the
evidence clearly preponderated in favor of Heber Creeper, Inc.
with respect both to its claim against Mr.
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Mendenhall in connec-

tion with the failed 1981 debt-retirement^ and stock purchase
agreement and with respect to its claims against Mr. Mendenhall
and Mr. Ritchie in connection with the 1982 disappearance and
alienation of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s assess; (5) that the trial
court found erroneously and against the Clear weight of the evidence in connection with those items; and (5) application of the
same principles of law to the facts concerning those items a to
the non-payment of the Settlement Agreemlent monies dictates that
this Court should modify the trial courtl's judgment to award
Heber Creeper, Inc. additional damages ^gainst both gentlemen in
the amounts proven at trial (against Mr. Mendenhall in the total
additional principal amount of $281f809j00f for a total principal
amount of $299f194.00; and against Mr. Ritchie in the total additional principal amount of $35f090.00f 4or

a

total principal

amount of $52,475.00).
Heber Creeper, Inc. hereby respectfully announces that
it will not further pursue its contention, indicated at pages 2
and 3 of its Supplemental Docketing Statement on file herein that
the trial court found against the clear weight of the evidence in
connection with Heber Creeper, Inc. 's c|laim that it should have
been awarded additional damages against Mr. Mendenhall, in the
principal amount of $91,500.00, by reasfcm of Mr. Mendenhall!s
alleged acts and omissions in connection with the 1980 grant of a
section of the "Heber Creeper" right-of-way to TPS rather than to
Heber Creeper, Inc.

For it is Heber Cr|eeper, Inc. 's view, on

reconsideration, that, with respect to that claimed item of
damage, the trial court could reasonably find, as it did, that
Heber Creeper, Inc. had not proved its entitlement to recovery.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CONDUCT OF BOTH MR. MENDENHALL AND
MR. RITCHIE FELL FAR SHORT OF THE
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CARE AND LOYALTY
DEMANDED OF DIRECTORS OF UTAH CORPORATIONS.
A.

The Duty of Care

In Warren v. Robison, 19 Utah 289, 57 P.287 (1899), this
Court held that directors are bound to
exercise such a degree of care, skill, and
diligence as is required by the situation
and nature of the business. By taking such
positions, although without compensation,
directors invite confidence that they possess
at least ordinary knowledge and skill, and
that they will do all that men of reasonable
prudence and caution ought to do to protect
the interests of stockholders. . . .
57 P. at 290.

In that seminal case, the Court ruled that the

requisite degree of attention and judgment demanded of corporate
directors is that which "an ordinarily discreet businessman would
give to his own concerns under similar circumstances."

^d. at

291. That degree of concern, according to the Warren Court,
requires directors to "devote so much of their time to their
trust as is necessary to familiarize them with the business of
the institution, and to supervise and direct its operation."

Id.

Nor, ruled the Court, can directors1 lack of due care and diligence be excused "on the ground that they did not know of the
unfortunate transactions, and were ignorant of the business."
Id.

The standard set in Warren has stood the test of time and is

still, some 87 years later, the law in Utah.

It was expressly

reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court as recently as 1979 in FMA
Acceptance Co, v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 13 32, 13 3 4 (Utah
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1979).
B.

The Duty of Loyalty

A companion duty owed by Utah business corporation
directors to their corporations is the di^ty of loyalty.

In Glen

Allen Mining Co. v. Park Galena Mining Cp., 77 Utah 36 2, 296 P.
231, (1931), the Court adopted the following rule of loyalty:
As long as the confidential relation
lasts the trustee or other fiduciary
owes an individual duty to his beneficiary, and cannot olace fiiniself in
any other position which wbuld subject
him to conflicting duties or expose
him to the temptation of acting contrary
to the best interests of his original
cestui que trust. The rule applies
alike to . . . administrators directing
and managing officers of corporations
as well as to technical trustees.

The duty of the directors iof a corporation is to further the interests and
business of the association and to
conserve its property. Any action
on the part of directors looking to
the impairment of corporate rights,
the sacrifice of corporat^ interests,
the retardation of the objects of the
corporation, and more especially the
destruction of the corporation itself,
will be regarded as a flagrant breach
of trust on the part of t^e directors
engaged therein.
296 P. at 240-241.
In Hoggan & Hall & Higgins, In<j:. v. Hall, 414 P. 2d 89
(Utah 1966), this Court affirmed that this duty of loyalty is
especially profound when the corportion is in financial
difficulty:
This court has been dedicated to the
principle that when a corporation is
in difficulty financially, a director
- 15 -

is duty-bound to render succor, not
secession, even as a parent would its
child.
Id. at 91.

As recently as 1982, the Court reaffirmed the

holdings of both Glen Allen Mining Co. and Hoggan & Hall &
Higgins, Inc.

And in that most recent case, Nicholson v. Evans,

642 P.2d 627 (Utah 1982), the Court added these observations:
[Directors] are obligated to use
their ingenuity, influence, and
energy, and to employ all the
resources of the corporation, to
preserve and enhance the property
and earning power of the corporation. . . . This duty extends
to all of the corporations assets. . . .
Id.

at 629.
C.

Appellantsf Breaches

It should perhaps here be recalled that Heber Creeper,
Inc.'s claims against Mr. Mendenhall deal with three separate
matters and the acts and/or omissions of Mr. Mendenhall with
respect to each:

(1)

the failure of consummation of the 1981

arrangement, in connection with which TPS was to acquire the
stock of Heber Creeper, Inc. and retire Heber Creeper, Inc.fs
debt; (2) the failure or refusal of TPS to pay Heber Creeper,
Inc. monies in connection with the 1982 Settlement Agreement; and
(3) the alienation and dissipation of certain of Heber Creeper,
Inc. assets during the 1982 operating season.

And it is also

here to be pointed out that Heber Creeper, Inc. claims against
Mr. Ritchie deal only with the latter two such matters.
Heber Creeper, Inc. submits that both gentlemen breached
their duties of loyalty and of care to Heber Creeper, Inc.
Neither exercised any effort whatsoever on behalf of Heber
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Creeper, Inc. with respect to the factual1 matters relevant
hereto.

If they had been diligent, they would have acted to

advance Heber Creeper, Inc.'s interests.

But they did not. If

they had been loyal, they would have acted on its behalf.

But

they did not.
Mr. Mendenhall's entire course pf conduct, as well as
even his testimony at trial, appears to Evidence a belief that he
apparently held prior to institution of this litigation and that
he claimed at trial still to hold, that there is nothing wrong
with a person's being on the boards of two competing or
conflicting corporations. Mr. Mendenhall's expressed attitude
that he was merely carrying out the wishes of TPS, in connection
with various incidents, that he was merely being, in essence, a
good soldier, does not comport with the requirements set forth by
the Utah Supreme Court regarding the sol|emn duties of corporate
directors.
rolling."

Nor does Mr. Ritchie desire to "keep the wheels
That TPS may have demanded cqrtain loyalty and care of

appellants is surely no defense to the fact that, time and time
again, their actions and omissions which helped TPS seriously
damaged Heber Creeper, Inc. that Mr. Mer)denhall was suggested for
intitial TPS Board membership for the pi^rpose of looking after
Heber Creeper, Inc.'s interests.
1.

The Failure to Consummate the
Purchase of Assets and DebtRetirement Agreement

Heber Creeper, Inc.'s largest $ingle claim is its claim
for $246,719.00 against Mr. Mendenhall in connection with the
failed 1981 purchase and debt-retirement agreement.
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As indicated

by the testimony of Lowe Ashton and as seen on the face of
Exhibit 3 (minutes of plaintiff's annual stockholders' meeting,
held April 4, 1981) and Exhibit 36 (handwritten minutes, from
Bona journal, of TPS February 19, 1981 meeting), a deal was in
principal reached in early 1981 and in connection with the
Heber Creeper, Inc.-TPS Lease agreement (Exhibit 4 ) , according to
which TPS was, among other things, to satisfy at least
$130,000.00 of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s debt to Ashton Oil and
Transportation Co. and to pay to Heber Creeper, Inc. one dollar
for each of the then-outstanding shares of Heber Creeper, Inc.
stock (the $116,719.00 figure is based on the Heber Creeper, Inc.
1981 Annual report (Exhibit D ) . Mr. Mendenhall not only failed
to exert any effort, as the then-sole member of both corporations' boards, and he not only failed to cause the even more
advantageous and TPS board-approval proposal of August 18, 1981
(Exhibit 48) to be passed on to Heber Creeper, Inc. for acceptance and consummation; he, one day later, along with one other,
Richard Buys, the then-president of TPS, with no intervening TPS
Board action, submitted the Auaust 19, 1981 "Prooosal" (Exhibit
6) to Heber Creeper, Inc., a "Proposal" that was, in short,
$246,719.00 less advantageous to olaintiff than was the deal that
Mr. Mendenhall was supposed to cause to be effected.
Mr. Mendenhall clearly breached his duty of loyalty to
Heber Creeper, Inc. in connection with these events of 1981. Mr.
Mendenhall, who testified at trial that he "didn't favor one
board over the other," also testified that the reason that he
made the August 19, 1981 Proposal, rather than the one adopted by
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the TPS Board the day, earlier, was that TfPS the earlier one was
not in TPS's financial interest.

Tr. at 738.

He expressed, even

at trial, no concern over the fact that ^eber Creeper, Inc. lost
the opportunity, because of his concern for TPS, to acquire a
most substantial benefit.
made by Mr.

One of the mo$t telling statements

Mendenhall in the course of this litigation is his

statement, made in his deposition and acknowledged at trial (tr.
at 473-74) in response to Heber Creeper, Inc. 's counsel's observation that the August 19, 1981 Proposal differed substantiallv
from the early 1981 arrangement and the prooosal adopted by the
TPS Board on August 18:

"So what?

It w^s still a oroposal."

Heber Creeper, Inc. submits tha|t Mr. Mendenhall failed
abysmally, in connection with the events of 1981, to discharge
his duty of care and his duty of loyalty, as defined by this
Court in the cases cited hereinabove.
With respect to the matter of Whether the events of 1981
and Mr. Mendenhall's role therein are prfoperly before the Court
(see page 5 of Appellants' Brief), Hebe? Creeper, Inc. offers the
following analysis.

Under Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules oE Civil

Procedure, a pleader is required only tcj> make a short and plain
statement of his claim.

This was expressly recognized by the

Utah Supreme Court in Blackham v.

Snelftrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 280

P. 2d 453, 454 (1955), as was the role played by the deoositiondiscovery process in preparation for trial.

280 P.2d at 455. A

review of the Complaint on file herein Indicates that Heber
Creeper, Inc. framed that pleading broadly enough to render it
unnecessary for it to seek to amend prior to trial.
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The

Complaint (record, pp. 1-5) specified certain items of concern
with regard to the allegedly unlawful acts of the defendants but,
by use of the phrase "inter alia

[among other things]," made it

clear that there might eventuate, in the course of discovery and
trial preparation, other specific concerns.

Mr. Mendenhall con-

tended at trial that he was surprised by Heber Creeper, Inc. 's
pursuit of the 1981 purchase and debt-retirement arrangement
claim and unfairly prejudiced by Heber Creeper, Inc. 's purported
springing on him of this claim for the first time at trial.
Heber Creeper, Inc. 's response is that there is no foundation
whatsoever for Mr.
prejudice.

Mendenhall's protestation of surprise and

No fewer than 15 pages (pp. 135-150) of the

transcript of his deposition are occupied by questions and
answers dealing with the events of 1981 and his role therein.

At

no point in the course of that questioning did Mr. Mendenhall
interpose an objection as to relevancy.

Tr. at 469-70.

have, in short, realized that Heber Creeper, Inc.

He must

had con-

siderable concern in connection with his acts and omissions in
connection therewith.

Then, in what is denominated answer 1(e)

in its Response, (record, pp. 211-218) dated February 4, 1985 to
Defendant Gordon Mendenhallfs Interrogatories Heber Creeper, Inc.
expressed its position that Mr. Mendenhall had breached his fiduciary obligation to Heber Creeper, Inc. with respect to "all
litigation and pre-litigation disputes between. . . plaintiff
and. . . Timpanogos Preservation Society...." As Lowe Ashton
testified at trial, it was when he received, as Heber Creeper,
Inc.'s president, the August 19, 1981 Proposal signed by
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TPS that he knew Heber Creeper, Inc. had been "took."

Tr. at

108.
Heber Creeper, Inc. submits that}, if Mr. Mendenhall was
not satisfied with the generality of the aforesaid answer
1(e), he should have filed a motion to ccj>mpel a more specific
response.

Furthermore, in its Amended Response to Defendant

Mendenhallfs Interrogatories (record, pp, 269-77) and in its
final proposed Pre-Trial Order (record, pp. 359-76), Heber
Creeper, Inc. expressly and specifically indicated, on pages,
respectively, 2 and 11, its intent to pujrsue the 1981 purchase
and debt-retirement arrangement aspect of its claims against
Mr. Mendenhall.
Also, Heber Creeper, Inc. callsi to the Court's attention
the requirement of Rule 54(c)(1) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires that
every final judgment shall! grant the
relief to which the party i in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even
if the party has not demanded such
relief in his pleadings.
Finally, the trial

court appears to haye resolved, in Heber

Creeper, Inc.'s favor, the question of Whether the 1981 debtretirement and purchase aspect of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s claim was
properly before it for trial.

For its findings of Fact, nos. 27

through 33 (see Appellants' Brief at pp,. 36-37) dealt with the
facts surrounding this aspect of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s claim.
Mr. Mendenhall is and ought to be held no more free from the
imposition of liability for his role in| the 1981 events than for
his other proven misdeeds and, for his 1981 acts and conduct, he
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is liable to Heber Creeper, Inc. in damages in the amount of
$246,719.00.
2.

The Failure to Cause Payments to
be Made Under the 1982 Settlement Agreement

May 12, 1982, the day the Settlement Agreement (Exhibit
2) was executed, was supposed to herald a new day of peace, harmony, and fairness for all concerned in the operation of the
train.

The steady erosion, however, of Heber Creeper, Inc. 's

vitality continued apace.

This time Mr. Mendenhall had help,

however unwitting it may have been, from Mr. Ritchie.

Both

gentlemen resumed their positions as directors of Heber Creeper,
Inc. on May 14, 1982, minutes after being apprised by former
Governor of Utah Calvin Rampton of their fiduciary duty to look
after the interest of Heber Creeper, Inc. and its shareholders
(Exhibit 9, Minutes of Annual Shareholders1 Meeting, page 13).
On June 12, 1982, the Heber Creeper, Inc. Board adopted a policy
of confidentiality in the course of a meeting at which, among
other things, serious questions were raised concerning TPS and
its manager, Monte Bona.

Ex. 27.

On June 14, 1982, two days

later, Mr. Mendenhall, at a TPS Board meeting, not only breached
plaintiff's policy of confidentiality; he also nominated Monte
Bona to a position on the TPS Board.

Ex. 38.

Eight days later

Mr. Mendenhall resigned as a director and officer of Heber
Creeper, Inc. Ex. 14.

Nine days after writing his letter of:

resignation, defendant Mendenhall wrote Heber Creeper, Inc.'s
president a letter (Exhibit 17) setting forth a debt supposedly
owing from Heber Creeper, Inc. to TPS which, if it ever existed,
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had clearly been extinguished by the express terms of the
Settlement Agreement.

(It is undeniably (clear, that any and all

pre-Settlement Agreement claims of TPS against Heber Creeper,
Inc. were wiped out when that document was executed.
pp. 11-12).

Exhibit 2,

It is indicative of Mr. Mencfenhall' s attitude that

he testified, at his deposition and admitted at trial (tr. at
493) that he would have written such a letter, if the TPS Board
had requested him to do so, even if he had still been a member of
Heber Creeper, Inc. 's board.

The fact tlfiat Mr.

Mendenhall had

resigned 9 days prior to his bringing th£ bogus claim to Heber
Creeper, Inc.'s attention as an excuse npt to pay the food sales
payments due under the Settlement Agreement does not, in any
event, render him immune from liability for his post-resignation
misconduct with respect to acts and polibies which were adverse
to his corporation's interests and whichi were planned, decided,
or agreed upon prior to his resignation |but which are manifested
only after resignation.
In the aforementioned case of dlen Allen Mining Co. v.
Park Galena Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 29^ P. 231 (1931), this
Court rejected the argument of the defendants, former
director-officers of the plaintiff corporation, that they were
shielded from liability because certain acts harmful to the corporation did not come to fruition until the defendants had
resigned their posts.

In that case the evidence was that the

defendants had developed and put into motion their nefarious plans
prior to the formal termination of thei^r fiduciary positions.
The Glen Allen Mining Co. Court quoted with approval, 296 P. at
231, the following observation from an Earlier non-Utah case:
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'Nor is it any defense to the suit
to enforce this trust that the agency
had terminated before the confidence
was violated. The duty of an attorney
to be true to his client, or of an
agent to be true to his principalf does
not cease when the employment ends, and
it cannot be renounced at will by the
termination of the relation. It is as
sacred and inviolable after as before
the expiration of its term.'
And in the recent case of Microbiological Research Corporation v.
Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981), the Court reaffirmed the Glen
Allen Mining Co. rule and restated it as follows:
[W]here a transaction has its inception
while the fiduciary relationship is in
existence, an employee cannot by resigning and not disclosing all he knows
about the [transaction] subsequently
continue and consummate the transaction
in a manner in violation of his fiduciary
duties.
Id. at 695.
The inference clearly to be drawn, as the trial court
apparently did, is that Mr. Mendenhall had knowledge, prior to
the time of his resignation as a director and officer of Heber
Creeper, Inc., of the TPS plan, which he, as a TPS board member,
in all likelihood helped formulate, to pursue the false claim for
monies due.

There is, simply, no record of the occurrence of a

TPS board meeting between June 22, 1982, the date of Mr.
Mendenhallfs letter of resignation, and July 1, 1982, the date of
the letter setting forth the phony claim.

Nor could Mr.

Mendenhall or TPS operative Monte Bona recall, during the trial,
the holding of any such meeting.

Nor could Mr.

Mendenhall

recall having informed Heber Creeper, Inc. 's president, Gene
Moore, prior to July 1, 1982, of TPS's intent to pursue that
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claim.

Also, Gene Moore testified that t}he first time he had

knowledge of TPS's intention to pursue ttyat claim was when he
received Mr. Mendenhallfs July 1, 1982 letter.

The law as

applied to the reasonably inferable fact$ of this case thus leads
inexorably, as the trial court appears t0 have recognized, to the
conclusion that Mr. Mendenhall cannot, by virtue of his June 22,
1982 resignation, escape liability in connection with non-payment
of the Settlement Agreement-mandated amounts.
Subsequent to July 1, 1982, Mr, Ritchie and Mr.
Mendenhall participated in and carried otit the TPS policy of
utter non-pavment, with the bogus debt u$ad as a continuing
reason not to pay.

The two comprised ha[Lf of the TPS Board

through at least November 30, 1982 (see Exhibit 56 - Minutes of
TPS Board meeting of that date).

During the TPS Board meeting of

July 7, 1982 (Exhibit 39), Mr. Mendenhal|l seconded a motion
(which, like all the many motions that a|re memorialized in the
various TPS minutes that are part of the record in this case, was
unanimously passed by those trustees pre|sent) that, rather than
cash payment of food sales percentages, due, "credit" be given on
the bogus debt.

No money was ever paid,) despite the clear abi-

lity of TPS to make the payments as they) fell due.
Mr. Ritchie's defense of his rc^le in the non-payment and
of his role in attempting to thwart Heb^r Creeper, Inc.'s
obtaining of legal services to pursue the debt that was so
clearly owed (tr. at 235-36) and that w^s so clearly not about to
be paid can be distilled to his professed desire to keep the
wheels a-rollin1 and to give TPS as goocj a chance and apparently
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as long a chance (10 years or so) as Heber Creeper, Inc. had had
to make a return to Heber Creeper, Inc.'s shareholders on their
investments.

Tr. 237-38, 519-27.

Despite Mr. Ritchie's trial

counsel's valiant efforts, it has clearly been established that
Mr. Ritchie was indeed both a director of Heber Creeper, Inc. and
a trustee of TPS throughout the 1982 season.
5, 56). Mr.

(See, e.g. exs. 9,

Ritchie's virtual carte-blanche trust in TPS and

Monte Bona and unwavering disinterest in and hostility for Heber
Creeper, Inc.'s aggressive pursuit of its Settlement Agreement
claim against TPS clearly establish his failure to live up to the
duty of the highest good faith that the law required of him while
he was a member of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s Board of Directors.

He

was, like Mr. Mendenhall, disloyal to Heber Creeper, Inc. He too
breached confidentiality by reporting to the TPS board, on
September 28, 1982 (Exhibit 46), on the goings-on of Heber
Creeper, Inc.'s Board meeting of Seotember 17, 1982 (Exhibit 26)
and retention of legal counsel.
disloyal.

Mr. Ritchie was not only

He also clearly breached his duty of care as defined,

hereinabove, by this Court. He acknowledged, at trial (tr. at
523) the admission, made in his deposition, that he didn't check
the facts, though "maybe" he should have.

Unfortunately for Mr.

Ritchie, the law of the State of Utah does not recognize figurehead directors.

He undertook a solemn duty to concern himself

with the protection of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s interests and he,
like defendant Mendenhall, abjectly failed adequately to
discharge that duty.
The uncontroverted testimony of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s
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expert, C.P.A. Ron King, not only thoroughly debunked the notion
presented to the trial court that virtually anything (i.e.,
unfettered TPS control) was worth a try ^fter the supposedly
horrendous financial failure of the train operation while it was
under Heber Creeper, Inc.'s control.

Mr. Kinq also

offered credible and similarly uncontrov^rted testimony (see
Exhibit 34 and tr. at 357-66, that $17,3^5.00, rather than the
$10,000.00 minimum, is the amount for which Mr. Mendenhall and
Mr. Ritchie should be held liable to Heb^r Creeper, Inc. in connection with non-payment under the Settlement Agreement.
3.

The Allowance of the Dissipation and
Alienation of Heber Creeper, Inc. 's
Assets During 1982

Mr. Craig Drury, former operations manager for the
train, testified that in or about February of 1982 he brought to
Mr. Mendenhallfs attention certain concerns he had with the 1981
train operation and particularly the practices of operations
manager Monte Bona.

Tr. at 257-65. The Credible testimony was

that Mr. Mendenhall told Mr. Drury in th^t conversation, that he,
Mr. Mendenhall, did not trust Monte Bonaj.

Nonetheless, the 1982

operating season again found Monte Bona ht the helm.

According

to the uncontroverted testimony of Willijam Schultz, by the time
Mr. Mendenhall (who never has decided exiactly what story to tell
about why he resigned from Heber Creeper), Inc. 's Board; (see,
e.g. , tr. at 399-406; 727-28) quit his f^eber Creeper, Inc. posts
on June 22, 1982, the historic Harriman coach had been gutted and
the valuable scrap metal pile had been Substantially depleted.
Tr. at 295-307.

The work was done in daylight, as part of regu-
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lar TPS operations.

Tr. at 303. Both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr.

Ritchie, according to the testimony of both Mr. Schultz and
former TPS president Richard Buysf spent considerable time during
the 1982 season, before and after June 22 of that year, on and
around the train terminal grounds where the pilferage occurred.
Neither gentleman lifted a finger to stop the alienation and
dissipation of Heber Creeper, Inc.'s assets.
knew what was happening.

Maybe they

Maybe they did not. The point is that

they should have known, they should have cared, and they should
have done soemthing to stop it. Even if they did not have the
visceral wherewithal to stand up to Monte Bona or whoever else
was destroying what were then some of the most valuable of
Heber Creeper, Inc.'s remaining assets, they should have alerted
the Heber Creeper, Inc. Board to what was going on.

As the trial

court observed, it is obvious what Heber Creeper, Inc. 's president, Gene Moore, would have done if he had been informed of what
was happening to his corporation's assets under the auspices of
the TPS operation.
202.

He would have taken steps to stop it.

Tr. at

Both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie, perhaps even more par-

ticularly Mr. Mendenhall because of the warning he had been given
by Mr. Drury, either were aware or should have been aware of what
was happening.

And both, if they had cared, would have known

what was happening and would have taken steps to halt it. But
nothing was done to stop the continued erosion of Heber Creeper,
Inc.fs assets.

Whether it was a simple lack of care or further

acts of disloyalty will probably never be known.

But the former

possibility is obvious, and the latter may fairly be inferred.
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Again both Appellants acted, or [failed to act, in a
manner that clearly fell short of the reqjuirements established by
this Court.

The damages suffered by Heb^r Creeper, Inc. as a

result of Appellants' misconduct in this regard, according to the
credible testimony - that Mr. Murl Rawlins - is $35,090.00, said
total representing the estimated total c0st of restoration of the
Harriman coach to its pre-gutting conditijon ($24,590.00) plus the
estimated value ($10,500.00) of the scra$ metal that disappeared.
Exhibit 32; tr. at 310-30, 343-49).
POINT II
BOTH APPELLANTS ARE LEGALLY CHARGEABLE
WITH DAMAGES VISITED UPON HEBfR CREEPER, INC.
In Warren v. Robison, 19 Utah 2$9, 57 P.287 (1899),
discussed hereinabove, some of the defendants, directors and
officers of a banking corporation, were fclso directors of other
corporate entities to which loans were m£de on questionable and
suspicious terms and which failed to rep^y and defaulted on the
loans.

This Court, in the course of reversing the trial court's

nonsuit against several of the directors, did not concern itself
with precisely what role any of the directors played in the
defaulting entities1 non-payment of the lloans. The focus of the
Court's concern in that case was not on the defaulting entities
at all.

It was on the attitude and cond|uct of the banking cor-

poration's directors.

Heber Creeper, In|c. commends the entire

case to the Court's attention and suggesjts that the teachings of
the case include the notion that, where a corporation's director's conduct and attitude are shoddy enough, in connection with
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his delegation of authority and his dealings with third parties,
an inference, if not, indeed, a legal presumption, may arise to
the effect that that director is legally answerable to his corporation for damges suffered in connection with his questionable
acts.

Some of the facts of the Warren Court's observations seem

to almost foretell things that happened in the instant case.
Those observations include the following:
It is certainly quite startling to
notice that a bank in the hands of
honest business men, as the directors
and officers were reputed to be,
should in so short a space of time
meet with so many heavy losses as to
actually wreck the institution.
57 P. at 287.
The directors were not intended to
be mere figureheads without duty or
responsibility.
Id. at 289.
The duties of directors are administrative,
relate to supervision and direction,
and when it is sought to hold them
responsible for a dereliction of duty,
because of which a loss occurred to
stockholders and creditors, they cannot evade liability by pleading ignorance of the affairs of the institution,
incompetency, or gratuitous service,
or that the management of banking
business was in the hands of the
cashier or other executive officer.
Id. at 290.
In Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 826-829
(N.J. 1981), the unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court offered the
most thorough and compelling analysis Heber Creeper, Inc. 's counsel has been able to locate on the question of proximate causa-
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tion of damages in a setting analogous t0 that now before the
Court.

Plaintiff commends that entire analysis to the Court's

attention and here offers the following excerpt:
In assessing whether Mrs. pritchard1s
conduct was a legal or proximate cause
of the conversion, " [l]ega responsibility
must be limited to those ciuses which are
so closely connected with phe result and of
such significance that the law is justified
in imposing liability." pro sserf supra, §
41 at 237. Such a judicial
icial determination
involves not only considerations of cusation-in-fact and matters or policy, but
also common sense and logic. Caputzal v.
The Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 77-78, 222
A.2d 513 (1966). The act br the failure to
act must be a substantial factor in producing the harm. Prosser, supra, § 41 at
240; Restatement (Second) pf Torts, §§ 431,
432 (1965).
Within Pritchard and Baird , several factors
contributed to the loss of the funds:
commingling of corporate and client monies,
conversion of funds by Cha rles, Jr. and
William and dereliction of her duties by
Mrs. Pritchard. The wrongdoinq of her sons,
although the immediate cause of the loss,
should not excuse Mrs. Pri|tchard from her
negligence which also was a substantial factor contributing to the loss. Restatement
(Second) of Torts, supra, § 442B, comment
b. Her sons knew tht she,! the only other
director, was not reviewing their conduct;
they spawned their fraud in the backwater of
her neglect. Her neglect of duty contributed to the climate of corruption; her
failure to act contributed to the continuation of that corruption.
Consequently, her conduct was a substantial
factor contributing to th$ loss.
Analysis of proximate cau >e is especially
difficult in a corporate :ontext where the
allegation is that nonfea >ance of a director is a proximate cuse o damage to a
third party.... Where a c Lse involves nonfeasance, no one can say, "with absolute
certainty what would have occurred if the
defendant had acted other ise." Prosser,
supra, § 41 at 242. None heless, where it
is reasonable to conclude that the failure
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to act would produce a particular result
and that result has followed, causation may
be inferred. Ibid. We conclude that even
if Mrs. Pritchard1s mere objection had not
stopped the depredations of her sons, her
consultation with an attorney and the
threat of suit would have deterred them.
That conclusion flows as a matter of common
sense and loqic from the record. Whether
in other situations a director has a duty
to do more than protest and resign is best
left to case-by-case determinations. In
this case, we are satisfied that there was a
duty to do more than object and resign.
Consequently, we find that Mrs. Pritchard's
negligence was a proximate cause of the
misappropriations.
To conclude, by virtue of her office, Mrs.
Pritchard had the power to prevent the
losses sustained by the clients of
Pritchard & Baird. With power comes responsibility. She had a duty to deter the
depredation of the other insiders, her sons.
She breached that duty and caused plaintiffs to sustain damages.
432 A.2d at 828-829.

For the Court's information, Pritchard and

Baird was the corporation.

The estate of Mrs. Pritchard was

a defendant. Plaintiffs included the corporation's trustee in
bankruptcy.

In analogizing the facts of that case to the facts

of the instant case, the Court should, Heber Creeper, Inc.
suggests, focus on the equities of the instant case, the Francis
court's application of the Prosser and Restatement rules
referenced therein, and the conduct of Messrs. Mendenhall and
Ritchie herein.

If the Court determines that it is not egre-

giously disloyal or nefarious acts of the Appellants that have
damaged Heber Creeper, Inc., but rather that it was TPS as an
entity or Monte Bona, or some combination of actors or factors
that have worked, in whole or in part, directly to visit the subject damages upon Heber Creeper, Inc., the Court should at least
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conclude that the subject damages were suffered as a result of
acts and conduct, in the words of the Frajncis Court, "spawned in
the backwater of [Apoellants'] neglect."

rd. at 829.

At the conclusion of trial the t^rial court queried as to
the significance of the role played by orie director with respect
to corporate action taken by a board of 1|4 or 15 members that
damages another corporation of which such a director is also a
board member.

Tr. at 790-91. Heber Creeper, Inc. concedes that

if TPS had been a corporation with such 4 large number of
trustees, Heber Creeper, Inc. 's case against Apoellants might be
much more difficult.

The point, howeverf is that, as with the

Francis case, the TPS Board was a small board.

The corporation

in Francis had a 3-member board. The TPS Board never had, it
appears, more than 4 or 5 members.
apparently, but 4:

Throughout 1982 it had,

Mr. Mendenhall, Mr. Ritchie, Richard Buys,

and, for part of the year, Monte Bona.

$eber Creeoer, Inc.

submits that it is not only logical but JLn accordance with the
foregoing legal analysis to conclude (1) that the smaller the
governing body is the greater is the influence, for good or for
ill, that a director or trustee wields afid can be expected to
wield; and (2) that, on the facts of thijs case, there is no impediment to the Court's holding both Appellants liable for acts and
conduct that damaged Heber Creeper, Inc. and that were the product of what appears to be TPS Board-applroved action.
Finally, of further guidance ma|y be a very recent Utah
Supreme Court case, one that is more genjeral in its reach than
what is required here, but one that aop^ars to have considerable
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bearing on the issue of liability of both Appellants to the
extent that they have tried to paint themselves as mere agents of
TPS.

In Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, (Utah 1985), this

Court adopted the following standard:
If an agent commits a tort while
acting on behalf of his principal ,
the fact that he is an agent does
not insulate him from liability
to the injured party. The agent's
liability is determined solely
upon the common-law obligation that every person
must so act or use that
which he controls as not
to injure another. . . .
[W]hether he is acting on
his own behalf or for
another, an agent who violates
a duty which he owes to a
third person is answerable
to the injured party for
the consequences. It is
no excuse to an agent that
his principal is also liable
for a tort . . . Nor is an
agent who is guilty of
tortious conduct relieved
from liability merely because he acted at the request, or even at the command or direction, of the
principal, unless he is
exercising a privilege of
the principal to commit
the act.
Id. at 699 (quoting from 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 300). Neither Mr.
Mendenhall nor Mr. Ritchie can find sanctuary in his contention
that it was TPS, not he, that damaged Heber Creeper, Inc. And
Heber Creeper, Inc. contends, the trial court correctly aoplied
the rule of personal liability to the acts and omissions of both
Appellants in connection with the non-payment of the 1982
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Settlement Agreement entitlements and incorrectly applied it in
finding no liability against Mr. Mendenhall in connection with
the failed 1981 purchase and debt-retirement arrangement and
against both Mr. Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie in connection with
the 1982 dissipation and alienation of H^ber Creeper, Inc.
assets.
POINT III
THE ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY APPELLANTS ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY UTAH LAW, ARE BASED ON
INACCURATE OR INCOMPLETE RECORD EVIDENCE,
AND MUST FAIL.
A

•

The Duration of Directors' Fiduciary Duty

At pages 8 and 9 of their Brieff Appellants have brought
to the Courtfs attention a number of encyclopedic references and
cases from Florida, Kansas, and Wyoming Which appear to stand for
the general proposition that a director'£ fiduciary duty to his
corporation terminates as of the time of termination of his
directorship.

Application of this argument is apparently

intended to be limited to Mr. Mendenhall), inasmuch as Mr. Ritchie
was unquestionably a director of Heber C^reeoer, Inc. from May 14,
1982 until February 1983 and (Ex. 27) wab removed only as Heber
Creeper, Inc.'s Vice President on September 17, 1982.

(It should

here be recalled that the Judgment from Which Appellants have
appealed is limited to the non-payment ojf: funds to which Heber
Creeper, Inc. was entitled for the 1982 (season and is founded on
the May 12, 1982 Settlement Agreement (E|x. 2)). As to Mr.
Mendenhall, Appellants1 argument fails t^> address the ongoing
nature of a director's duties spelled ou|t, as quoted on p. 15
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hereof, by this Court in Glen Allen Mining Co, v. Park Galena
Mining Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 P. 231 (1931).

Nor does Appellants1

argument seek to apply the relevant language of this Court in
Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981),
to the facts of this case.

Heber Creeper, Inc. respectfully sub-

mits its analysis of the facts of this case, set forth at pp.
24-25 hereof, in light of the relevant language of Muna quoted at
p. 24 hereof. It appears quite clear, as the trial court herein
found, that Mr. Mendenhall cannot escape liability merely because
he resigned his Heber Creeper, Inc. position nine days before he
made written demand for payment to TPS of a debt which, if it
ever existed, had clearly been extinguished by the Settlement
Agreement.
B. The Supposed Efforts to Cause the 1982
Settlement Agreement Monies to Be Paid
At pages 10 and 11 of their Brief, Appellants have
apparently sought to characterize themselves as having been consistently desirous that the monies due Heber Creeper, Inc. from
TPS be paid.

As is pointed out hereinbelow, the record simply

does not support such a position.

Nor, incidentally, and contrary

to the statement made thrice at those pages of Appellants1 Brief,
was Mr. Monte Bona ever president of TPS.

And to the extent that

the Court is inclined to qive weight, with respect to any of the
issues presented on appeal, to any of Mr. Bona!s testimony
contrary to Heber Creeper, Inc.'s position, the Court is respectfully directed to review the lengthy impeachment Exhibit 62,
referenced at pp. 784-86 of the transcript, as well as the
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transcript at 652-663 and 679-70, to acquire a feel for Mr.
Bonaf s aoparent lack of respect for the jjudicial process.
Mr. Mendenhall himself testified! (tr. at 445) that he
had TPS authority to cut checks.

And even if Mr. Bona told Mr.

Mendenhall not to make the payments, Mr. Bona had no authority to
do so.

Mr. Bona was, as of September 7, 198 2, merely, like Mr.

Mendenhall and Mr. Ritchie, one of a handful of TPS Board members.

The record does not appear to indicate that Mr. Bona held

any corporate office.

Furthermore, the record is replete with

references to the fact that, prior to th^ TPS meeting of
September 7, 1982, the supposed debt owed TPS by Heber Creeper,
Inc. was used as a reason not to pay any part of Heber Creeper,
Inc.'s Settlement Agreement entitlement.
With respect to concessionaire Gordon Wheeler's supposed
failure to give an acounting to TPS of fjood sales, that would
certainly not excuse the TPS trustees, ijncludincr Mr. Mendenhall
and Mr Ritchie, from making at least substantial payment on the
$10,000.00 minimum due Heber Creeper, Ir\c.

Furthermore, Mr.

Wheeler was not rquired to give an accounting to Heber Creeper,
Inc.

Tr. at 125.
With respect to Mr. Ritchie's ifole in the non-payment,

the record is clear, as indicated at pp1 25-26 hereof, that he was
concerned not with causing Heber Creepetf, Inc. to be paid the
monies it was clearly entitled to receiye, but rather to keep the
wheels of the train rolling and to give TPS as much time,
apparently, as TPS wanted before payment was to be forthcoming.
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C.

The Sufficient Basis for the Award of
The Amount Ordered by the Trial Court

At pages 11 to 14 of their Brief, Appellants have contended that the evidence on which the trial court determined the
amount due Heber Creeper, Inc. ($17,38 5.00) under the terms of
the 1982 Settlement Agreement was insufficient to support that
determination and the concomitant award of judgment against
Messrs. Mendenhall and Ritchie in that amount.

The trial court's

determination that that was the appropriate amount, rather than
the $10,000.00 minimum mandated by the Settlement Agreement, or
any other amount, was apparently based on the testimony of Heber
Creeper, Inc.'s expert, C.P.A. Ronald K. King, exhibit 34, and
the failure of TPS and it paid accountant, Mr. Mendenhall, to
provide Mr. King any records other than those (proffered Exhibit
33, which was not received) presented him by Mr. John Roberts, an
agent of TPS.

Appellants have cited no authority for their pro-

position (Appellants' Brief, p. 11) that Exhibit 34 should not
have been received.

Heber Creeper, Inc.'s position is that Mr.

King's methodology (tr at 361-66), of comparing the historical
percentage relationship of ridership dollars to food sales
dollars to the ridership figures presented to him by Mr. Roberts,
was sound, and that the trial court did not err in receiving Mr.
King's testimony or Exhibit 34.
With respect to the reduction of monies due under the
Settlement Agreement apparently claimed by Appellants
(Appellants' Brief at 13) by virtue of the supposed
"unavailability" of the NARFAM coaches, Heber Creeper, Inc.'s
response is simple:

there is no record evidence whatsoever that
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those coaches, or any of them, were ever in fact "unavailable" to
TPS.

They were, regardless of any msigiyings which anyone may

have had, in fact used by TPS throughout the 1982 operating
season.

Even Mr. Monte Bona has admitted this fact.

Tr. at 698.

The trial court's determination that $17,385.00 was the
amount that Heber Creeper, Inc. should h^ve received under the
Settlement Agreement was and remains, ba£ed on the record herein,
unassailable.
D

•

The Insufficiency of M K Ritchie's
Claim That He Acted as "Peacemaker"

At page 14 of their Brief, Appellants have sought, as
was attempted at trial, to exonerate Mr. Ritchie from liability
on the claimed basis that he acted, in a[Ll resoects material
hereto, as a "peacemaker"; that he sought to act "in the interest
of the train"; that he "represented both parties fairly and was
interested in running a railroad"; and t^at his object in serving
as a director of Heber Creeper, Inc. was to "stop the lawsuits."
It is perhaps of note that no such claimi of neutrality is made on
behalf of Mr. Mendenhall.

With respect Ito Mr. Ritchie, Heber

Creeper, Inc.'s position has been made, it is confident, abundantly clear:

the law of this State, asj set forth in the deci-

sions of this Court cited hereinabove, Remands, of directors of
Utah for-profit corporations, vigilance and aggressive pursuit
of the corporation's interests.

Mr. Ritchie's acts and

omissions, as discussed hereinabove and even, Heber Creeper, Inc.
suggests, as characterized on page 14 of| Appellants' Brief, fall
far short of that standard.
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IV
CONCLUSION
Appellants should not have done what they did to damage
Heber Creeper, Inc., and should have done things that they did
not do to protect Heber Creeper, Inc.

They let their corporation

down, and they broke the promise that the law required of them to
work with the highest good faith to advance their corporation's
interest.

Liability of both was clearly established at trial,

and Heber Creeper, Inc. urges the Court to sustain the trial
court's awards in connection with the non-payment of 1982
Settlement Agreement entitlements and to modiFy the Judgment to
provide that Heber Creeper, Inc. is entitled to recover the principal amount of $299,194.00 against Gordon Mendenhall and to
recover the principal amount of $52,475.00 against Leon Ritchie.
Respectfully submitted this

~r~

day of April, 1986.

PETER C. COLLINS
Attorney for Respondent and
Cross-Appellant
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